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Abstract 
 
Researchers in the information system (IS) field have recently called for the field to 
legitimate itself by erecting a strong theoretical core at its center. This paper 
examines this proposition, and concludes that it is logically invalid and does not 
recognize ample evidence to the contrary from the history of other disciplines. We 
construct a broader concept of academic legitimacy around three drivers: the 
salience of the issues studied, the production of strong results, and the maintenance 
of disciplinary plasticity. This analysis suggests that to remain successful, the IS field 
needs intellectual discipline in boundary spanning across a “market of ideas” 
concerning the application of information technology in human enterprise.  
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discussed our ongoing struggle to make sense of the evolution of the IS field. These include 
colleagues at Case Western Reserve University, the University of Michigan, Georgia State 
University, the University of Western Ontario, Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, Nanyang Business School, London School of Economics, Aagdar College, the 
University of Colorado at Boulder, IRIS 1999, 2003, and AMCIS 2003 Philosophy track 
among others. We are particularly thankful to Ron Weber, Detmar Straub and Sirkka 
Järvenpää for their insightful comments on earlier versions of the paper. 
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“Turning and turning in the widening gyre, 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer, 
Things fall apart, 
The centre cannot hold”3 
 
William Butler Yeats (1865-
1939), “The Second Coming” 
 
Introduction 
 
The Information Systems (IS) field arose from humble origins in the 1970s. The field 
is perhaps 30 years old, and is about as far along as might reasonably be expected 
in terms of size, quality, and institutional status. Nevertheless, the IS field continues 
to be haunted by feelings of inadequacy. Such sentiments are most common in North 
America (Benbasat and Weber, 1996; Markus, 1999; Benbasat and Zmud, 2003), but 
are also found in Europe (Ciborra, 1998; Stowell and Mingers, 1997). The most 
common manifestation of this sentiment is the lament that the IS field lacks a 
theoretic core, and for that reason, is rightly seen to be academically inadequate by 
critics inside and outside the field.   
 
This is a serious accusation.  If well founded, it is a profound indictment of the IS 
field, inviting appropriate sanctions unless remedied.  If groundless, it imposes 
needless pain on the IS field, and arguably misdirects energy that would be better 
spent on other matters.  This paper analyzes the argument that academic legitimacy 
hinges on the presence or absence of core theory.  It finds the argument logically 
weak and empirically refutable.  This result does not imply that stronger theory is 
unwelcome in the IS field, or that such theory would not help strength the field’s 
reputation.  It merely suggests that the current fixation on legitimizing the field 
through pursuit of a core theory around which to center inquiry and intellectual 
mission is misplaced.   
 
To move the discussion forward from the debate around the nature of core theories, 
this paper suggests an alternative model of disciplinary legitimacy grounded in three 
drivers: the salience of the issues studied, the production of strong results, and the 
maintenance of plasticity. These principles have sustained the growth of the IS field 
over three decades, and established it as a legitimate actor among academic fields. 
They preclude a center of fixed core ideas or relationships and, if properly cultivated 
and enacted, they will suffice to improve the legitimacy of IS for the foreseeable 
future. Accordingly, the IS field must replace the notion of the fixed core with a 
metaphor of a center of activity (or life form) that builds identity and legitimacy for the 
field (Boland and Lyytinen, 2004).4 This center is best seen as the free flowing give-
and-exchange metaphor of the IS discipline as a market of ideas in which scholars 
(and practitioners) exchange their views regarding the design and management of 
information and associated technologies in organized human enterprise. Our essay 
concludes with an analysis of positions that IS scholars can take in relation to the 
market of ideas and how this institution can be strengthened as the true focal point of 
the IS discipline.  
 
                                                
3 We are indebted to Detmar Straub for this excellent quote 
4 This seemed to be also Keen’s  (1987 p. 3) idea when he wrote” “Our backgrounds, training 
and interests are very different. We must take that as strength, not a cause of argument.” 
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The Anxiety Discourse 
 
The concern about the IS field’s academic legitimacy has been described elsewhere 
as part of an “anxiety discourse,” in which evidence of inadequacy (e.g., disrespect 
from people in other academic fields) is traced to intellectual shortcomings in the IS 
field itself (King and Lyytinen, 2004).  This anxiety discourse weaves through the IS 
literature, starting even before the field’s founding in the late 1970s.  This early 
anxiety was not specifically directed at theory, but rather at the expected difficulty of 
building computer-based systems that could actually provide useful information for 
managers (Dearden, 1972; Ackoff, 1967).  Such apprehension might be unique to the 
IS field.   The creators of artificial intelligence, which emerged at about the same time 
as IS, exuded optimism while facing challenges far more daunting than those of the 
IS field. Early pioneers in IS sustained their apprehension in spite of undeniable 
triumphs in the development of complex information systems, while the pioneers of 
artificial intelligence remained optimistic in spite of legendary failures to achieve the 
goals they set for themselves.  There is clearly something more complex than 
academic legitimacy at work in the anxiety discourse. 
 
The discourse shifted as the IS field became a more identifiable academic enterprise.  
It was soon recognized that the challenges of the IS field extended beyond the 
designing and building of systems, and into understanding the organizational 
mission, adoption, diffusion, and effects of such systems.  These challenges could 
only be met by sourcing ideas from a wide array of intellectual perspectives, which 
researchers justified in the discourse as the adoption of intellectual standards of 
“reference disciplines” for IS-related inquiries (Keen, 1980, 1991).   The reference 
discipline rubric suggested that the field lacked a coherent intellectual center, though 
its intellectual mission and knowledge needs did center around a shared interest in 
the applications of information technology to human enterprise (Kling, 1980).  This 
initial juxtaposition of the IS field’s intellectual mission and its sources – a center 
grounded primarily in praxis, and an intellectual periphery drawing intellectual capital 
from outside the field – formed the foundation for the anxiety discourse that was to 
follow.  Soon, those within the field began to question the quality of the field’s 
intellectual effort and status (e.g., Mumford, et al., 1985), and doubted that the field 
could retain its praxis-based center when other intellectually powerful academic fields 
came to recognize the importance of IT in organizations (Weber, 1987).  This cast 
serious doubts on the theoretical status of the field, and precipitated tension between 
the praxis-oriented center and the intellectual periphery.  Many came to doubt that IS 
could cohere sufficiently to survive (Banville and Landry, 1989; Maggi et al., 1986, for 
a critical evaluation see Robey, 1996). 
 
By the mid 1990s the anxiety discourse had evolved into an “orthodox” view that the 
field’s survival depended on substituting its praxis-based core with a theoretical core 
grounded in well-defined intellectual constructs drawing on a model of research 
attributed to the natural sciences (Benbasat and Weber, 1996; Benbasat and Zmud, 
2003).5   Despite researchers’ careful refinement of this position over a set of articles, 
the “core theory” view has not proved satisfactory in damping the anxiety. The 
discourse has remained stalled in a refrain that can be summarized as follows: 
 
                                                
5 This tension is also well documented in the endless debates over relevance vs. rigor 
observed as early as Keen’s (1980) concept of reference disciplines and their relationship to 
the intellectual mission of the IS field.  In this argument, rigor came from reference disciplines 
while relevance resided in the praxis-oriented core. This issue is beyond the scope of this 
essay, but it should be noted that preferring one attribute – in this case theoretical rigor over 
praxis-based relevance –  lies at the heart of both stories. 
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The central focus of the IS field is so important that other 
academic fields will want to appropriate it.  Yet, the center of the 
IS field is theoretically too weak and diffused to generate 
sufficient solidarity to maintain a consistent research focus that 
would protect the field’s long term viability.  This weak condition 
generates disrespect from the more theoretically powerful fields 
that surround the IS field and that seek to appropriate the IS 
field’s central focus.  Manifestations of disrespect toward the IS 
field from these other fields constitute proof of the IS field’s 
intellectual and theoretical inadequacy. 
 
 The perceived disrespect toward the IS field by other fields within management 
schools (e.g., attempts to push IS courses out of the required curriculum, efforts to 
deny IS faculty promotions) understandably generates feelings of inadequacy among 
IS faculty.  The question arises as to whether these feelings of inadequacy should be 
attributed to intellectual and theoretical inadequacy, and specifically that the IS field 
is inadequate because it lacks a theoretical core at its center.  As the following 
analysis shows, this is not a defensible attribution. 
 
Legitimacy Through Theory? 
 
The central question is whether the IS field’s legitimacy rests on the presence of a 
theoretical core.  In order to be convincing, the argument that legitimacy can be 
gained only through the possession of a theoretical core must be both valid and 
sound.6  To examine this, it is necessary to establish the truth conditions for the 
elements of the argument, to analyze the validity of the inference involved in making 
the claim, and finally to determine whether the argument is sound.  
 
Truth Conditions  
 
Legitimacy is inherently relative and subjective: it cannot be conferred or attained 
through objective means.  It has meaning only with respect to some socially 
constructed standard or expectation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).  It is very difficult 
to establish truth conditions for the assignment of legitimacy to any academic field.  
This does not mean that the concept of academic legitimacy is without meaning or 
import.  Legitimacy reflects a field’s institutional power, its problem solving 
capabilities, its methodical and cognitive distinctiveness, its applicable research 
outcomes, its value in education, and so on.  Nevertheless, it remains unclear how 
legitimacy is established in general among academic fields (Andersen, 2000).   This 
raises the first serious challenge to the argument that academic legitimacy is 
established by the presence of a theoretical core. 
 
This challenge is shown by the fact that none of the commentaries about the IS 
field’s need for a theoretical core have articulated exactly what is meant by the term 
“theoretical core,” a point acknowledged by Weber (2003).  Benbasat and Zmud  
                                                
6 A valid argument is a logical deduction of the form, derive q from pq and p, e.g.: All men 
are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is mortal.  Validity is not enough: the argument must 
also be sound, meaning that both the conditional claim (p→q), and the antecedent (p) must 
be true for the consequent (q) to be concluded.  An invalid argument cannot be sound, but a 
valid argument can be unsound, e.g.: All men are dogs; Socrates is a man; Socrates is a dog. 
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(2003) attempt to address this problem by defining the rules of exclusion and 
inclusion that define the properties of typical IS theory.  However, since there is no 
objectively determined definition of a “typical” IS theory, this solution must depend on 
a widespread agreement among the IS field as to what that term means.  In fact, this 
solution is not a description of truth conditions, but a plea for the IS field to come into 
agreement on terms that can be adopted as standards against which behavior can 
be measured. Currently, the field is far from agreeing on such terms, and many 
attempts to achieve agreement have failed to affect where the field is moving. Even if 
such an agreement should emerge, the agreement itself would be arbitrary with 
respect to the truth.   
 
The philosophy of science is replete with discussions of these problems (cf. 
Chalmers, 1999; Radnitzky, 1968; Habermas, 1971; Rorty, 1979).  Principles 
deployed to argue in favor of a specific legitimating measure immediately call into 
question where these principles came from and how they might be justified.   It is 
noteworthy that these higher level principles cannot be derived analytically or 
empirically without an infinite regression of logical induction, wherein a first tier 
principle is justified by appeal to a second tier principle, the second tier principle is 
justified by appeal to a third tier principle, and so on (Lee and Baskerville, 2003).  In 
the case of the IS field, there is no way to decide conclusively what counts as a 
theoretical core.  The best the field can achieve is a specific, historical, inter-
subjective agreement among its members as to what will count as a good theory, at 
any given time, backed by a set of redeemable warrants (Toulmin, 1958).  The next 
step is to determine whether the IS field has redeemable warrants for any notion of 
the theoretical core. 
 
The position most often invoked to warrant the need for a theoretical core is a version 
of Popperian analytic philosophy.7  According to Popper (1968), academic fields 
make progress through refining and refuting theories that explain phenomena falling 
within the domain of the field.  Theories must be subject to refutation (i.e., falsifiable), 
through which they can be rejected or refined.  New theories emerge as a result of 
investigators’ attempts to explain problems by alternative models, formulated within 
the scope of established theories.8  Popper’s analytic philosophy could potentially 
serve as a warrant for the centrality of a theory in legitimating the IS field, but it is 
only one point of view, and it has been severely criticized by other philosophers for 
logical and empirical weakness (cf., Schilpp, 1974; Feyerabend, 1982; Lakatos and 
Musgrave, 1970; Stove, 1982).  It is just as reasonable to suggest that theories 
across academic fields vary significantly due to differences in social organization and 
prevalent research tasks, and that no uniform relationship can be established 
between a given field and a specific type of theoretical core (Whitley, 1984).  Overall, 
the anxiety discourse is fundamentally and constantly challenged by the absence of 
clear truth conditions for judging the claim that the presence of a theoretical core will 
produce legitimacy for the IS field. 
 
 
 
                                                
7 The authors are indebted to an anonymous reader of an earlier version of this paper who 
explicitly used Popper to argue in favor of particular warrants, thus revealing the centrality of 
Popper’s views to this discussion.  
8 Popper’s view has other problems with respect to the argument for legitimacy as a 
consequence of a strong theoretical core.  His view captures only nomological explanations, 
and excludes widely accepted theories such as Darwinian natural selection evolutionary 
theory. Moreover, his view does not clarify whether academic fields are defined by theories, 
or theories by fields, although he expresses the opinion that the former ought to be the case.  
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Validity 
 
Assuming that reliable truth conditions could be established for the claim that a 
theoretical core is necessary for legitimacy, the argument must next be evaluated for 
its validity.  The normal argument in favor of a strong theoretical core flows through 
the following complementary syllogisms: 
 
 
(1)  All x :TC (x) → LF (x)  entails     (1b)  All x: ¬TC (x) → ¬LF (x) 
(2)  TC (e.g., physics)     (2b)  ¬TC (e.g., is) 
(3)  LF (e.g., physics)      (3b)  ¬LF (e.g., 
is) 
 
    Where x = Academic discipline 
TC = having a Theoretical Core,  
LF = having legitimacy as an academic field 
 
 
Here syllogisms (1), (2) and (3) represent a set of logically valid deductions. A 
theoretical core implies legitimacy for a discipline: hence if a discipline has a core, it 
will also be legitimate. The argument thus far follows a valid form (modus ponens). 
The problem, however, comes with the syllogisms (1b), (2b), and (3b), which the core 
theory argument assumes- called the logical fallacy of denying the consequent. This 
suggests that a lack of legitimacy results from the lack of a strong theoretical core, 
and thus from the denial of the antecedent (theoretical core, modus ponens) the 
denial of the consequence (legitimacy) can be inferred. The chain (1b), (2b), and (3b) 
cannot be entailed from (1), (2) and (3), and is a logical fallacy. From the absence of 
something one can derive everything, which is tantamount to deriving nothing. 
Accusation (1b), “The lack of intellectual core implies the lack of legitimacy,” cannot 
be logically derived from accusation (1) “A strong theoretic core confers legitimacy,” 
rendering (2b) and (3b) inconsistent. The claim that the lack of a theoretical core 
deprives IS of legitimacy is invalid, and not worth further consideration. The syllogism 
(1), (2), and (3) remains valid (modus ponens), and in principle, gives support to the 
argument for legitimacy through a theoretical core if both (1) and (2) are true.9  
However, under these circumstances, the argument that a theoretical core is 
necessary for legitimacy cannot be established deductively, and can be made only by 
empirical induction. This raises the issue of soundness. 
 
Soundness 
 
Premise (1) implies an inductive generalization: all academic fields with a strong 
theoretic core are found to be legitimate, and that no legitimate field can be found 
that lacks a sound theoretic core.  This is a factual accusation, depending only on the 
accuracy of the facts being claimed.  It is difficult to demonstrate that all academic 
fields with a strong theoretic core are found to be legitimate: this requires a census of 
all fields and their theories as well as their status as legitimate. Since a single 
counter-example violates the induction and causes the argument to collapse, it is 
much easier to test the premise by finding an example of a field that is legitimate, but 
that has no theoretic core.  
 
                                                
9  We can also state that p →q, ┐q, therefore ┐p (modus tollens). This suggests that if a 
discipline does not have legitimacy it does not have theoretical core assuming that p →q is 
sound. This still requires vindication of the soundness of implication as elaborated below. 
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There are many legitimate academic fields that can be characterized by their focus of 
study, by the methods their members use, by the tendencies in their opinions or 
findings, and by their impacts on the thinking of those outside their field, but that have 
no theoretical core: classics, German literature, accounting, and history, to name a 
few.  There are also many legitimate academic fields that have possessed numerous, 
fundamentally different theoretical cores across their histories.   Early (Western) 
biology was entirely motivated by the belief that all life was created by God according 
to the Biblical creation story, and consisted of exploring and documenting the 
diversity of flora and fauna found in the Creation story.  Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 
provided one of the first theoretical mechanistic explanations for diversity in the early 
19th century, but it was not widely accepted by practicing zoologists and botanists.  
Charles Darwin’s monumental mid 19th century theory of natural selection slowly 
became an accepted organizing rubric for biology, but has undergone dramatic 
reconstruction since that time and is still disputed even among biologists.  
Psychology emerged from incoherent speculation about the nature of mind in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, only to be transformed in the late 20th century when 
instrumentation enabled closer study of the relationship between brain and mind.  
Geology explained morphology and stratification solely through 18th century concepts 
of erosion, especially those grounded in the Biblical flood, until the mid-20th century 
advent of plate tectonics upended all previous theory.  Despite this turmoil of theory, 
the legitimacy of these fields has never really been questioned. The presence of a 
strong theoretic core can sometimes be useful in establishing or sustaining 
legitimacy, but it is unsound to argue that having a theoretical core is necessary for 
that purpose. 
 
Legitimate academic fields have long been characterized by theoretic instability over 
their histories (Kuhn, 1996).  Indeed, the intellectual history of the academy itself is 
one of instability. Universities of the late medieval period were dominated by theology 
and philosophy.  The Renaissance university branched into the “natural philosophy” 
of biology and physics.  Biology differentiated into botany, zoology and bacteriology 
in the early-19th century, reorganized around the relative complexity of organic   
processes (biochemistry, molecular biology, physiology, developmental biology, 
ecology, evolutionary biology) in the mid-20th century, and underwent yet another 
reorganization focusing on mechanisms such as enzyme metabolism and molecular 
proteomics in the late 20th century.  Physics branched into chemistry, geology and 
other specialties during the late 18th and 19th centuries, only to be transformed in the 
20th century into hybrid fields such as earth systems science (geology, atmospheric 
chemistry, oceanography).  Most interesting, physics and biology have re-converged 
in structural biology (crystallography, biophysics, molecular and macromolecular 
biology). Despite such turbulence, the legitimacy of these fields has never truly 
wavered. 
 
Legitimacy Reconsidered 
 
The foregoing discussion deconstructs the main argument that academic legitimacy 
depends upon the presence of a theoretic core. If the presence of a theoretical core 
does not make an academic field legitimate, what does?  In light of the evolution of 
different disciplines and an analysis of mechanisms that have made them legitimate, 
three factors can be seen that account together for disciplinary legitimacy: 1) salience 
of the subjects studied, 2) the strength of results from the study, and 3) the plasticity 
of the field with respect to changing circumstances.  While none of these factors 
alone seems to be enough for academic legitimacy,  there are no legitimate fields  
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that do not have all these characteristics simultaneously.10   We will look at each of 
these factors in turn to determine where the legitimacy of the IS field resides and 
what can be done about it. 
 
Salience 
 
The pragmatics of IS-related knowledge 
Research and education embodied in collegiate IS programs – as in any 
processional field – are dependent upon the patronage of the larger society that 
invests in such programs in the expectation of long-term societal benefits. Fields that 
appear to be dealing with socially salient issues are more likely to be legitimized:  
they can claim resources because of their pragmatic legitimacy (Robey, 2003).  As 
such, the salience in the IS field is about pragmatic legitimacy, which ‘rests on the 
self-interested calculations of an organization’s most immediate audiences’ 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 578). 
 
 The IS field’s origins can be traced directly to the very salience of its subject matter, 
not its theory per se.  IS programs originated because modern business 
organizations needed IS professionals, and these organizations exerted pressures 
on professional schools (primarily in business administration and management) to 
produce them.  Indeed, the early anxiety found in Ackoff (1967) and Dearden (1972) 
can readily be interpreted as a concern that the expectations of businesses eclipsed 
the abilities of both academic and practicing experts.   
 
Salience in the IS field despite the recent downturn 
Over the years these fears proved to be unfounded, and the success of information 
systems as a practice has been demonstrated beyond question.  The salience of the 
IS field is still evident, as seen in the rapid build up of demand for IS professionals as 
the dot.com boom evolved.  It was obvious to organizations that the future envisioned 
during that boom required many more highly trained IS professionals.  Recruiters 
went wild, salaries skyrocketed especially in the North America, and IS programs 
rapidly added faculty and courses to meet the demand.   The fact that the dot.com 
boom collapsed demonstrates that salience can be fickle, but the phenomenon of the 
boom illustrates how powerful a force business can be in legitimating any academic 
field.   
 
Despite the repercussions of the dot.com collapse, the salience surrounding IS 
remains high in the future.  Investment in IT continues to rise, and the application of 
IT to organizational functions continues to grow.  In 2004, the salience of IT is still 
seen clearly in concerns about outsourcing and the offshore movement of high-value 
IT jobs.  If these jobs were not important, and believed to be increasingly important, 
no one would care that they are moving.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 
that job growth in the next five to ten years will show much greater demand for IT-
related jobs than in any other area of skilled work.11   This does not mean that the 
ecology of IT-related jobs will not change in the future. In response to this, the IS field 
must become more aggressive in finding ways to match its talent pool to the newly 
emerging salience at the center.  Ironically, the threat that other fields might take over 
the salient center of the IS field has probably been reduced by the collapse of the 
dot.com boom and the perceived shift of IT jobs overseas. 
 
 
                                                
10 We are thus arguing for S&R&P→L. This naturally can be rejected by finding a counter-
example like the one we demonstrated for the theoretical core argument.  
11   Cf. http://www.bls.gov/emp/empfastestind.htm 
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Salience as primary generator of legitimacy 
To summarize, the IS field cannot protect its claim on salience by replacing the 
salience of its praxis with a core body of theory because theory has value only in 
reference to praxis.  Building an edifice of theory at the center of the IS field might 
please observers from other academic fields who think that theory by itself is 
valuable, but those observers are not going to support the IS field with resources that 
they can just as readily claim for themselves.  At most, they can offer or withhold their 
approval within the academic power structure. One must then ask why the IS field 
needs or should seek the approval of those observers, and whether this is the only 
way to obtain their approval.  Other academicians have no resources of their own to 
confer on the IS field, even if they were willing to do so (and they are not).  Their 
resources come from exactly the same place the IS field’s resources come from: the 
larger society that sees value in the work being done.  To the extent that these fields 
have power over the IS field, it is in their ability to wrongfully appropriate the IS field’s 
salience and redirect the resources raised by that salience to their own ends.12  Thus 
the competition between the IS field and other academic fields is ultimately not about 
theory at all – it is about the right to appropriate the social salience of the work being 
done, and the resources that perceived salience generates from the society at large.  
Attempting to substitute theory for praxis at the center of the IS field is actually likely 
to hasten the field’s decline. 
 
Strong Results 
 
No field can capitalize on the salience of the issues it studies without providing 
sustained benefits from its effects.  The IS field, like all fields, achieves this through 
the application of proven techniques that yield high-quality research and instruction.13  
Some of those techniques involve the generation and refinement of theory, and 
theory is often essential to the outcome, but the creation of theory per se is not the 
final game.  Theory, to the extent that it has a role, is in the service of producing 
strong results.  Strong results are the provably valuable consequences of research 
and instruction within the society as materialized in artifacts, behaviors, and 
expectations.  Strong results are rather easy to demonstrate on the instructional side: 
smart people with good IS training usually outperform smart people without good 
training. This, of course, was the main original motivator for establishing the field 
(Ackoff, 1967; Deaden, 1972; Mason, 2004) combined with the salience of how to 
systematically offer information for organizational activities in ways that would 
harness the potential of the emerging “IT artifacts.” 
 
 Strong results are also easily seen in new artifacts that fundamentally change social 
behaviors (like ground-breaking computer programs or technologies like operating 
systems or cellular phones). The IS field abounds with examples of such artifacts, 
ranging from tools for decision support, and group decision support to CASE tools, 
development methods, and large scale application systems (e.g. ERP), some of 
which have been influential while others have been less so. To search for rigor and 
systemic criteria in assessing and developing such artifacts has gained growing 
interest in the “sciences of the artificial” (Simon, 1996) through the development of 
design science and design theories (see e.g., Hevner, et al., 2004). 
                                                
12 Both authors have seen this happen as members of university committees and reviewers 
for research funding agencies. 
13 This is similar to what DeSanctis (2003) pointed out recently when she wrote: “Evidence of 
legitimacy of the IS field lies not so much in the establishment of organizations such as the 
Association for Information Systems (AIS), schools of information science, and university 
departments; instead, the evidence of legitimacy lies in the actions of people within and 
between these organizations as they pursue their scholarly work” (emphasis added).  
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It is harder to demonstrate strong direct results from research ideas and models due 
to the nature of research itself, but when this happens the impact on society can be 
deep – cases in point are the victory over the Ptolemaic view of the universe and the 
formulation of theories of relativity. In the IS field, demonstration of such theoretical 
advances is more difficult to pin down exactly, as reflected in the anxiety discourse. 
This does not mean, however, that the impact of the IS field in the theoretical plane is 
negligible. It has greatly advanced understanding of the impact and role of 
information in any organizational activity, how it relates to the design of artifacts, and 
how organizations operate as socio-technical systems. Such impact is also felt 
throughout different social sciences, as shown by the citation patterns of IS research 
within other fields (Baskerville and Myers, 2002).   This does not mean, however, that 
strong results within IS have resulted in what Benbasat and Zmud (2003) call 
“cognitive legitimacy,” i.e., that all IS theories are taken as granted by environmental 
constituencies and alternatives to IS have become unthinkable (Robey, 2003). At 
most, strong theories in IS have gained pragmatic legitimacy which rests as noted 
above “on the self-interested calculations of an organization’s most immediate 
audiences” (Suchman, 1995, p. 578). Research that produces strong results 
demands long periods of sustained effort.  Progress is possible only by pushing 
forward the frontier of the known, a bit at a time.  The quality of the research process 
is tied to the quality of results produced.  Academic fields that produce strong results 
typically adhere to and enforce high standards with respect to knowledge claims and 
the ways in which those claims are redeemed.  There is no inherent value in the 
process itself; all value accrues through the results of the process.   
 
The quality of the process might determine the quality of the results, but it is only an 
input to the results.14  In the IS field, as with any field with praxis at its center, the 
processes of research must be aimed at improving the strength of the results that 
affect praxis.  Along the way, the results often inform other areas of work beyond the 
IS field to create generalizable knowledge.  This is a good thing, and should be 
welcomed and even sought, but it will not legitimate the field.  It can, at best, 
enlighten those in other fields to the fact that results useful to them are arising from 
research in the IS field. 
 
There is a persistent hint in the anxiety discourse to the effect that research tied too 
closely to praxis is not really research at all, or at least, that it is an inferior form of 
research.15  This sentiment is probably the result of a more general confusion about 
the nature of research, and the dysfunctional distinction between basic and applied 
research.  This distinction rightly discriminates between research results that are 
immediately applicable to some problem, and those that are not, but that have the 
potential to affect many problems in the future when more is known.  The problem 
with the distinction is with the political interpretation that has evolved to favor “basic” 
over “applied” as truer, purer, and more worthy of praise. The primary function of this 
interpretation is to direct social resources away from obviously salient applied 
research to less salient basic research.   
 
As noted earlier, truth claims related to legitimacy are social constructions, and the 
preference of basic over applied research is no exception.  The preference has roots 
in the legacy of the medieval and Renaissance academy that preferred thought over 
                                                
14 This explains why scientists make public their methods in the process of producing the 
results. Quality control over process distinguishes science and scholarship from other forms 
of producing knowledge. 
15 This seems to be implied when Benbasat and Zmud (2003) call for theories based on 
nomological nets and argue for the value of a “dominant research paradigm.” 
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practice, and even over empirical study.  A more immediate story is found in the mid-
20th century fable of the processes by which knowledge produces economic and 
social welfare.  This fable can be seen in many sources, but the most widely cited is 
Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report, Science: The Endless Frontier.  Bush’s linear model of 
the relationships between science, technology, and society is shown in the top 
diagram in Figure 1a: scientific discovery creates technological innovation, which 
then produces improved welfare.16  This model is popular among some policy makers 
and among many scientists, but it bears little relationship to the facts.  Considerable 
research in the history of science and technology suggests that the lower cyclical 
diagram (Figure 1b) is more accurate: technological innovation occurs largely apart 
from basic research, creates economic growth, and generates a surplus that can 
then be invested by society in basic research that assists but seldom directly causes 
technological innovation (Gillespie, 1957; Hall, 1963; Mathias, 1972; Rosenberg, 
1992). The examples are plentiful.  Advances in sea-travel in the 15th century forced 
the development of better astronomical theories.  Problems with steam engines 
precipitated Carnot’s work on thermodynamics.  Difficulties in development of 
databases stimulated Codd’s work on relational theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Linear Model of Science, Technology and Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Cyclical Model of Science, Technology and Society 
 
The relationship between practice and theory as suggested by the cyclical model is 
much more complex and nuanced than assumed in simple linear models about 
scientific innovation. Donald Stokes has explored this issue in depth in his book 
Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes, 1997).  Stokes calls basic research the “quest for 
                                                
16 Bush had been President of MIT, but was serving as an advisor to President Truman.  His 
report is credited with creating the momentum that led to the establishment of the National 
Science Foundation (Bush, 1945).   
Science Technology Welfare 
Technolog
y 
Welfare 
Science 
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fundamental understanding” and applied research is “considerations of use.”  Each 
constitutes an essential dimension of a dynamic model in which research can be high 
or low on either dimension (Table 1).  He cites Niels Bohr, a founder of quantum 
theory, as an example of one who contributed to fundamental understanding but 
relatively little to use, and Thomas Edison as an example of one who contributed to 
use but little to fundamental understanding.  In his top quadrant, he cites Louis 
Pasteur as an example of one who contributed greatly to both.  
 
Pasteur’s work was often inspired by practical problems, the most famous of which 
was the spoilage of beer and wine. Food preservation in the early 19th century was 
primitive.  The alcohol in beer and wine was a preservative, making these important 
foods, but they inevitably spoiled in a relatively short time after opening.  Pasteur’s 
development of a technique to heat the liquid to a point below boiling for a certain 
time (Pasteurization, later applied to milk and other products) solved the problem by 
killing the microorganisms in the liquid.  Pasteur’s fundamental insights in 
stereochemistry and microbiology launched modern biological chemistry.  The point 
of Stokes’ book is that the most noble research is not “basic” in the usual sense, but 
rather advances both use and fundamental understanding simultaneously. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes, 1997) 
 
 
    Research Inspired by                             Considerations for User? 
  
  Low High 
High 
Pure Basic 
Research  
(Bohr) 
User Inspired 
Basic Research 
(Pasteur) 
 Quest for Fundamental               
Understanding? 
 
Low 
 Pure Applied 
Research 
(Edison) 
 
Reprinted by permission of the Brookings Institution Press 
 
As stated earlier, there is nothing wrong with the creation of solid theory in the quest 
for fundamental understanding in the IS field.  On the contrary, this is an important 
endeavor, and the IS field’s success in this endeavor will certainly help legitimize the 
IS field in academic circles.  The critical thing, however, is to understand how 
improved theory achieves greater salience, and thereby to recognize the inherent 
limit of theory’s contribution per se to legitimation.  There is nothing special about 
theory: it is merely one component in the process of developing useful knowledge.  
The word arose from the Latin theoria, derived from the Greek theros, or “spectator.”  
It has evolved in meaning over time to refer to a view of the world that constitutes 
speculation without reference to particular instances or practices.  It is a “step back” 
from the actual phenomena to find a broader characterization that encompasses the 
instances at hand.   It is useful only because it is a cost-effective means of making 
sense out of many particular instances and helps orient the researcher more 
effectively toward the world. The value of theory resides solely in its ability to make 
sense of what actually happens in the world. At its best, theory covers a great many 
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instances and many dimensions of those instances, thereby reducing the burden of 
understanding. In academic parlance, a good theory can cross academic boundaries 
and inform many different lines of inquiry. 
 
In academic fields with praxis at their center, theory must serve praxis. For example, 
legal theories lay foundations for legal practice by clarifying and justifying ethical 
choices. In IS, theories provide ways of seeing into and intervening in socio-technical 
problems. Theory is only contributory to the development and constitution of the 
center, but it cannot be the center.  Praxis-related theories sometimes arise from 
those working directly on the issues at the practical center, and they sometimes arise 
at the periphery of the field and are brought to the center.  It does not matter where 
the theory comes from, except with respect to who gets credit for the contribution.   
 
To summarize, the IS field’s legitimacy depends on the strength of its results with 
respect to the praxis at the field’s center.  It is desirable, of course, that strong results 
at the center of the IS field inform other fields whenever possible, and that other 
fields appreciate the IS field for such contributions.  It does not matter whether strong 
results are produced with or without theory.  Most strong results are likely to be built 
on some theoretical components, but there is nothing necessary in this.  There is no 
sense in presuming that theory can constitute the IS field’s center and this alone will 
allow the field to remain salient. 
 
Plasticity 
 
Salience can be ephemeral, and for very good reasons.  Once a major social 
problem is solved through research—or as Hughes (1993) states when the significant 
“reverse salients” that prevent the deployment or use of large scale technological 
solutions have been removed in the society—it stands to reason that the problem will 
no longer be socially or technologically salient-. For example, astronomy emerged as 
a key theoretical inquiry to overcome the reverse salients of the sea-fare, 
thermodynamics to overcome the challenges of building more efficient steam engines 
and so on. But these issues are no longer of  significant theoretical importance in 
physics research.17 The history of the academy demonstrates that the legitimacy of 
academic fields lies not in holding tight to the reasons for the field’s emergence, but 
in keeping the field’s center “plastic” by adapting to the shifting salience of the issues 
that might concern it.  Only by keeping the field’s center plastic will the field retain its 
capability to produce strong results, and with strong results legitimacy follows.  This 
is no different with the IS discipline or any other field in management.  Robey (2003), 
for example, promotes “adaptative instability” as a key strategy to ensure the IS 
discipline’s legitimacy, while Galliers (2003) talks about the need for boundary 
spanning, critical reflection, and a wide range over related subject matter.    
 
Plasticity is, however, only a correlate of legitimate fields, not a cause. Plasticity, in 
itself, does not produce legitimacy, although in itself it helps keep the field salient.  
But when smart people work on salient issues, the field can expect to produce strong 
results also in the future. Likewise, the IS field cannot sustain its legitimacy in the 
long run without being plastic.  Despite its youth, the IS field has demonstrated this 
many times in its evolution, and the benefits of this plasticity to the field have been 
significant.18 
                                                
17 There are however some points where these old theories may need revision and salience. 
For example, the first Apollo launches required much more accurate calculations than 
Kepler’s traditional laws to predict the movement of earth and moon. 
18 The often raised criticism of the IS field as being driven by “fads” can be interpreted also as 
a field’s attempt to retain plasticity in the face of extremely fast change in its field of study.  
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Plasticity does not come easy, as change in academic world is not a simple matter, 
given the inherent conservatism of its institutions (Kuhn, 1996).  The inherent 
conservatism of academic institutions is well-founded and justified: the costs of 
building and distributing academic knowledge are high. Therefore, academic 
institutions furiously resist any attempt to change their current organization and 
associated theoretical cores, believing that hard-won knowledge should not simply be 
pushed aside by changing salience in the issues being studied.  In addition, 
academics know that strong results require tough and painful processes for making 
and redeeming claims of truth.  As a result, academic change is always an agonistic 
struggle between established and emergent views in light of growing knowledge and 
changing social needs. The biographies of great scientists illustrate this as a 
universal experience—the greatness of scientific heroes comes precisely from 
overcoming resistance and fighting against the odds and prejudice inherent in 
prevailing scientific knowledge.  Knowledge is built through an expensive and 
painstaking process of argument, postulation, repetitive testing, and successive 
approximation. Frivolous or politically motivated assaults on new and innovative 
ideas can stymie progress, or even result in setbacks. At the same time, it is 
appropriate to demand convincing arguments and evidence from upstarts. If new 
ideas succeed in taking the lead, they should be tested, redeemed, and found 
excellent. Therefore, legitimate and established fields have high standards for the 
establishment of fundamental knowledge; but they shed older fundamentals in favor 
of new when the standard is met.  This concept of durability of standards speaks for 
strong theoretical cores in the short term—but in the longer term theoretical cores do 
not create legitimacy.  What creates legitimacy is the capability to change and 
redeem any element of the theoretical lens that guides observation, explanation, and 
intervention (Kuhn, 1996). Established disciplines have always preserved their 
legitimacy by being plastic and responding to the needs and opportunities at hand. 
 
Academic change seldom results in wholesale substitution of new for old, but instead 
builds a layered genealogy of knowledge that sustains a coherent focus for the field.  
For example, quantum mechanics and plate tectonics supplemented rather than 
replaced classical mechanics and erosion in physics and geology, despite their 
contradictory models and conflicting chains of evidence.  Such change has usually 
been gradual in the history of science, but the pace seems to be accelerating with the 
rapid generation of new knowledge and changes in research practice.  
 
Plasticity sometimes comes only with struggle.  Computer science, like IS, is a 
relatively recent field that grew from a variety of academic roots.  Like IS, it has 
struggled for legitimacy.  In its early years it focused primarily on two areas: 
computability in the traditions of Alan Turing and John von Neumann; and application 
to practical problems such as ballistics calculation and code-breaking.  These two 
foci were complementary.  Processing and storage constraints in early computers 
encouraged efforts to improve performance; and theories developed around the 
analysis of algorithms, complexity, program correctness, and so on. The revolution in 
semiconductors and magnetic storage relaxed the earlier constraints, but computer 
science had already developed an identity and a theoretical core that was grounded 
in those early technology constraints.  Political infighting sometimes resulted in the 
                                                                                                                                       
We often see bad IS research that just follows fashion but some of the unique challenges of 
the field are its need for exceedingly high levels of plasticity due to the fluidity of its subject 
field.  
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stronger “theory” area pushing out the so-called “systems” area that included 
software and applications.19   
 
This internal conflict in computer science reached a catharsis in the early 1990s with 
the publication of Computing the Future: A Broader Agenda for Computer Science 
and Engineering, a report of the Computer Science and Telecommunication Board of 
the National Research Council (Hartmanis et al., 1991).20   The report argued that 
computer science must re-engage applications or face demise. Orthodox computer 
scientists protested the report, but it subsequently shaped the agendas of the 
National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Directorate for Computer and Information 
Science and Engineering (CISE) and the Computing Research Association (CRA), 
especially following the stunning rise of the Internet and the World Wide Web.  The 
idea continues to gain momentum: the NSF recently issued a report from a Blue 
Ribbon Panel, titled Revolutionizing Science and Engineering Through 
Cyberinfrastructure, that calls for the wholesale transformation of science and 
engineering research through the application of IT.21  Its plasticity has prevented 
computer science as a field from being left behind in the revolution that it helped to 
launch. 
 
Plasticity is a complicated matter for legitimacy because it potentially threatens 
identity.  The IS anxiety discourse tends to equate academic identity and academic 
legitimacy, but they are completely different (King and Lyytinen, 2004).  Identity is a 
necessary precondition for legitimacy, and plasticity, by threatening identity, indirectly 
threatens legitimacy. Yet, this threat is real only if narrow constraints are put on the 
issues to be studied.  An important kind of identity accrues to those who are 
consistently open to new ideas, and who look for the systematic relationships 
between seemingly separate things. If the IS field can be described as the study of 
the design and management of information and associated technologies in organized 
human enterprise,22 the resulting identity is both specific enough to be recognizable 
and broad enough to allow for healthy plasticity.  The great strength of the field in the 
past has been its boundary-spanning ability.  It could open the black box of 
information technology, and at the same time, move beyond the IT artifact to IT-in-
application in human enterprise where the consequences of IT occur. This has 
remained the salient core of the IS field, and has sustained the growth of IS field for 
three decades.  There is no reason to believe that this mission and associated 
plasticity will fail to sustain the field into the future. 
 
Recent discussions about the future of the IS field reveal the strength of this tradition 
of plasticity.  Intertwined with the call for a theoretical core has been a call for IS 
researchers to focus their attention on the “IT artifact” (Orlikowski  and Iacono, 2001; 
Benbasat and Zmud, 2003; Massey et al., 2001; Falkenberg et al., 1999; Bergman et 
al., 2002). This call seems to spring from the need to take the praxis at the center 
more seriously: to focus carefully on the artifacts that are created and materialized in 
practice and the effects they have. The intent behind an increased focus on the IT 
artifact is laudable, as it is aimed at consolidating the work of the field and reinforcing 
the praxis at its center. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to predicate the identity 
of the IS field on the IT artifact. This would unnecessarily narrow the borders of the 
                                                
19  More than one MIS group was formed in management schools by “systems” faculty exiled 
from computer science during this era of purges. 
20  The whole report is at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309047404/html/  
21  The report is at http://www.communitytechnology.org/nsf_ci_report/  
22We use purposefully a broad definition here so that the term enterprise should be seen as a 
generic human activity (to conduct a way of life in a specific way)-  not as a definition of an 
organizational form in which IT use takes place. 
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field in the direction of computer science, just as computer science is broadening its 
scope, and would run the risk of moving IS away from other areas that may become 
vital to the long-run salience of the field.  Moreover, it makes no sense for an 
academic field to focus attention exclusively on any artifact because artifacts never 
deliver value in their own right. They are complementary assets in production, and 
their value cannot be understood without the context of their application.  
 
Plasticity requires remaining flexible about the foci of study, and also about the 
meanings of the signifiers used to identify the field.  As Wittgenstein (1953) pointed 
out, it is important to be careful when naming fields because the meaning of the 
words may break down later on.  For example, the commonly used name 
“information systems” is too broad to establish a precise identity because it can 
encompass a wide array of subjects that could just as easily be claimed by computer 
science, library and information science, communications, journalism, or virtually any 
field that pursues information in a systematic manner (e.g., economics, political 
science).  Adding an adjective such as “Management” to the front of the name 
narrows the focus, but the IS field already tried that and abandoned the “M” long ago, 
retaining it only in formalities such as the journal Management Information Systems 
Quarterly.   
 
Similar naming difficulties have occurred in computer science.  The oldest U.S. 
professional association of computer scientists, the Association for Computing 
Machinery, struggled for several years in the 1980s to shed its hopelessly old-
fashioned name, “computing machinery.” The members could not agree on a new 
name that would produce the acronym ACM, which had become the organization’s 
de facto name.   Thus they retained the old name and ignored the “computing 
machinery.” Ironically, many leaders in computer science now feel that the signifier 
“computer” is too old-fashioned and prefer the broader “computing.”    Given that the 
names of academic fields age into placeholders for a set of plastic and fluid 
significations, it seems reasonable to accept the plasticity and fluidity of whatever 
rests at the centers of those fields.  
 
Is There Nothing At The Center? 
 
The title of this paper can be read several ways. First, it echoes the theme of the 
anxiety discourse that the IS field has no center worthy of the name—the falcon has 
become, in fact, a pigeon.  As noted earlier, this theme can take two alternative 
forms.  In one view, the only center worth having is a theoretical core that confers 
academic legitimacy--the falcon sees only the falconer. In another view, the field 
needs, but does not have, a consistent focus for its intellectual efforts--the falcon can 
see everything except the falconer.  Both views spring from the essential tension, 
observed since the inception of the field, between its praxis-focused center and its 
intellectual periphery. The anxiety discourse makes the mistake of trying to move the 
periphery to the center.  The IT artifact movement seeks to refocus and revitalize the 
field’s relationship to praxis, and is at least consonant with the legitimacy 
requirements of salience, strong results, and plasticity.  
 
The Market of Ideas as the Center 
 
Another reading of the title implies that the IS field has been unnecessarily 
preoccupied with its center, and, therefore, the whole idea of having a center is a red 
herring. The wearisome and cyclical anxiety discourse makes it tempting to abandon 
the whole discussion, but that would be as misguided an action as over-investing in 
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the search for a theoretical center.  The idea that there is something at the center, or 
that there ought to be something at the center, is obviously very compelling to any 
member of any field (King and Lyytinen, 2004).  It is only human to seek something 
unique and shared with those close at hand, and IS people are as human as people 
in any other field.  The needs of salience, the desire for strong results, and the quest 
for plasticity in the IS field preclude a center of fixed ideas or relationships, but they 
do not preclude a center based on a kind of activity. It is necessary to give up the 
metaphor of a center as a set of things and their fixed relationships to ideas, and 
replace that with a metaphor of a center as an activity (or life form) that builds strong 
identity and legitimacy for the IS field as time moves forward (Boland and Lyytinen, 
2004).23 This is accomplished by a free flowing give-and-exchange metaphor of the 
IS discipline as a market of ideas.  The real center in the IS field has been and will be 
constituted through a market of ideas in which scholars (and practitioners) exchange 
their views regarding the design and management of information and associated 
technologies in organized human enterprise.24 
 
For some, it might seem strange to consider a metaphor of a market as a center—a 
way to relate people, ideas, and artifacts--but there is much to recommend it. 25 The 
idea of a marketplace of ideas is by no means new.26 Daniel Webster captured it 
beautifully in 1825 in a speech at the groundbreaking for the Bunker Hill monument in 
Massachusetts, wherein he talked about “…a vast commerce of ideas” consisting of 
“…marts and exchanges for intellectual discoveries” that brought great improvements 
in human welfare.   His focus in that speech was the astonishing contribution of new 
knowledge to the human triumph “…over distance, over differences of language, over 
diversity of habits, over prejudice and over bigotry.”  The market had indeed 
produced remarkable changes in the world.  By 1825 steam had begun to power 
transport, the cotton gin had introduced mechanized agriculture, vaccination had 
been discovered, artificial coal gas was lighting cities, the British Parliament had 
overpowered the monarchy, and democratic institutions had arisen from the 
American and French revolutions.     
 
The market was by no means finished.  By 1875 the Bessemer process had made 
cheap steel the backbone of the industrial world, the railroad industry had invented 
operations management, the telegraph had revolutionized communication, slavery 
had been abolished, compulsory education had been widely established, and higher 
education was becoming widely available. 
 
Markets of ideas are ephemeral, but they support concrete actions needed for salient 
issues. They are remarkably fluid, which makes them capable of responding to 
rapidly changing conditions requiring plasticity.  They have the power to resolve 
                                                
23 This seemed to be also Keen’s  (1987 p. 3) idea when he wrote” “Our backgrounds, training 
and interests are very different. We must take that as strength, not a cause of argument.” 
24 This is similar to Desanctis’ (2003) statement   that the people and their “social life” make a 
field legitimate by enabling specific types of interactions on a set of chosen topics that lock in 
interested participants. We agree on this characterization but want to push the argument 
further by clarifying how dynamic, diverse and heterogeneous communities of inquiry can 
coalesce around the “market of ideas”. 
25  Lest this seem an unnecessary empowerment of economists, it is important to remember 
that economists did not invent the concept of markets, and they do not own the concept.  
Economists merely started studying markets along the way, and despite real progress, they 
are far from complete understanding of how markets function.  The markets being discussed 
here, which consist solely of information, are among the least understood. 
26 This concept is also close to Habermas idea of a “public sphere” and critical discourse in 
public as a condition for advances in technology, politics and society (see Habermas 1991, 
see also Toulmin 1972, Rorty 1979) 
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uncertainty, necessary for establishing strong results.  Markets embody the notion 
that any fair exchange is a legitimate exchange, which guarantees salience and 
plasticity in the long term.  An ideal market allows people to move value around 
without unnecessary impediment or cost. The center of a market is not the physical 
or virtual place in which it occurs (i.e., academic institutions), or the rules under which 
it operates (e.g., editorial policies).  It is not even the particular things being traded 
(e.g., a particular theory or results).  The center of a market is the empowerment of 
the participants, through due process, to place their own values on the things being 
traded. Where values align, transactions between ideas occur, and strong results, 
salience, and plasticity can follow. 
 
The idea that the market of ideas forms the actual center of the IS field has many 
additional virtues for its praxis-oriented outlook.  For one, it accommodates theory 
and praxis with equal respect, dispelling the notion that the two are exclusive.  It thus 
reinforces the concept of Pasteur’s Quadrant, legitimating all aspects of value in any 
intellectual exchange. This idea is also in line with generating a general body of 
knowledge (BoK) that helps address concerns about the use of IT in human 
enterprise (Klein and Hirschheim, 2003).  Second, it explicitly recognizes that anyone 
may enter or leave the market at will, which is an established tradition of the IS field 
(DeSanctis, 2003).  Rather than lamenting this fact, as the anxiety discourse normally 
suggests, the IS field should embrace it as a great source of strength as diversity and 
intellectual quality drive strong results. By allowing and invigorating new entrants, the 
market can respond more quickly to fundamental changes such as rapid 
technological improvement and the threshold effects generated when new 
technologies and techniques combine in disruptive ways.  Finally, by holding the 
market as the center, each member of the IS field can seek and find value in 
exchanges with like-minded colleagues.  If the market of ideas is the center of the IS 
field, it becomes irrelevant to ask what the theoretical center of the IS field is or ought 
to be. The answer to this question will always be whatever the market is working on 
at the time, and this might call on any number of theoretical perspectives.   
 
What does the market of ideas mean for IS academics?  
  
The “market of ideas” describes the modal center of the field, but it does not 
necessarily help individual IS academics locate their work in the field, or see how 
they can add value to the market while pursuing their professional goals.  In an ideal 
world, IS academics would never have to identify or justify the location of their work 
in the market, because the market would resolve issues of salience, results, and 
plasticity in due time.  Unfortunately, the world is not ideal, markets fail, and, 
therefore, each IS academic must find a reasonable place to stand when affiliating 
with a community of colleagues and pursuing career advancement. Given that each 
individual must make this choice from time to time, the question is not which choice 
to make but, rather, how to parameterize the options available to best exploit the 
market of ideas while honoring the need for security among individual scholars. 
 
Table 2 provides one way for IS academics to approach this challenge.   It suggests 
two dimensions that frame the political discourse in the conferring of academic 
legitimacy.  The first is a personalized view of the future of the field.  A personalized 
view sees the field primarily as a vehicle for one’s career advancement, and thus 
seeks to advance the researcher’s career within the empowered constructs of the 
field.  In this view, the individual sees the field as my field and has a personal stake in 
its future growth and legitimacy.  In a depersonalized view, the field is seen as an 
incidental aggregate of people with shared interests.  In this view, the field is a field to 
which I happen to belong at the moment, but I am not bound to it as a career option. 
The second dimension involves a choice of whether to conform to the status quo in 
Lyytinen & King/Nothing At The Center? 
   Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 5 No. 6, pp.220-246/June 2004 238 
the field in terms of its theoretical constructs and modes of inquiry as currently 
constructed.  A conforming choice accepts the field’s established theoretical biases 
and traditions as legitimate and authoritative, embodying the identity of the field and 
contributing to the field’s legitimacy.  A non-conforming choice considers established 
biases and traditions as products of a constantly changing mix of facts, theories, 
opinions, and beliefs that emerge in response to the research being done and the 
larger conditions in the society, such as the salience of the issues at hand.  In the 
non-conforming view, biases and traditions are temporary conditions of an inherently 
unstable and emergent intellectual enterprise. 
 
Table 2.  Parameters of Individual Position in Academic Fields 
  View of Self With Respect to the Field 
View of status quo  Personal Depersonalized 
Cell I Cell II Conforming 
Stable and 
established 
academic fields 
External commentary on the 
academic realm. 
Cell III Cell IV Non-conforming 
Entrepreneurial 
innovator, not viable 
in the academy 
Unstable and emergent academic 
fields 
 
Table 2 arrays these dimensions into a 2x2 matrix, with each cell describing the 
position an individual might take in relation to a field with a specific outlook on how he 
or she might approach the “market of ideas.” 
 
Cell I is the position most often taken by individuals in established academic fields 
that are stable with respect to their focus of study.  The paradigmatic example of this 
might be physics. It is no accident that many commentators concerned about the lack 
of academic legitimacy in the IS field hold physics up as an ideal exemplar of 
legitimacy, and use it as a paragon for a legitimate academic field (Weber, 2003). 
Physics exhibits academic power and pride; what other discipline would 
unselfconsciously refer to itself as the “queen of the sciences?” On the other hand, 
physics entertains the luxury of studying something that is “out there,” whether 
physicists are studying it or not.  There is no danger that the physical world is going 
to change before physicists figure it out, and even the most self-satisfied physicist 
does not claim to be actually creating the physical world.  Perhaps it is for this reason 
that the biases and traditions of physics change slowly and it has a strong and well 
organized body of theoretical knowledge--“core theories”—which are taught to each 
generation of aspiring physicists. As the noted physicist Max Born once claimed, 
theories in physics are never abandoned until their proponents are all dead, and the 
field advances “funeral by funeral.”   
 
Unfortunately, the models of science as applied to physics do not apply to most 
academic fields, and they certainly do not apply to fields that lie at the intersection of 
rapid technological and social change and a need to create the world anew, as 
Whitley (1984) observed in his classical study of the organization of academic fields 
(King and Lyytinen, 2004).  They certainly do not apply to the IS field, and, for this 
reason, aspiration to develop a strong core for IS does not look like a good strategy. 
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There are, however, people in the IS field who would like to locate all IS research in 
this cell and, therefore, place strong IS theories at the center. They naturally can 
promote and trade these ideas in the “market of ideas,” but in light of the earlier 
discussion of salience and plasticity, efforts to make the whole IS field look like 
physics are folly—they will not yield strong results and therefore not increase 
legitimacy, as a true market for ideas will not evolve. 
 
In Cell II a scholar holds a depersonalized view of a field, but is attentive to its 
intellectual biases and traditions, trying to understand how or why they emerged. This 
cell is commonly occupied by people who do scholarly work about the field by 
following and commenting on it.  Good examples of scholars adopting this position 
would be philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, scientometricians, and others 
who focus on particular fields and their evolution as their primary intellectual interest.  
Often, some of these individuals have backgrounds as practicing scholars in those 
fields, but for various reasons have left that work behind.  Well-known examples 
include Peter Medawar, a Nobel-prize winning biologist who became a philosopher 
and sociologist of science, and Thomas Kuhn (1996), a well-known physicist who 
became a still more famous sociologist of science.  Individuals who pursue such work 
typically move toward academic programs in science and technology studies, and out 
of the mainstream academic areas that are the focus of their commentary. Most 
fields also have people who “reflectively monitor” their own work by adopting the hat 
of a Cell II scholar.27  The utility of this effort for the field being studied depends on 
the intention of the commentator.  There is an important difference between 
genuinely depersonalized commentary that seeks to reveal how a field operates, and 
the promulgation of prescriptions on how the work of the field ought to be done.  
Thoughtful commentary helps those operating in the market of ideas put their 
activities in a larger context, with the goal of improving the quality of individual trades.  
Prescription, on the other hand, attempts to tell individuals what they should and 
should not be trading, and thus weakens the power of the market.   
 
Cell III is populated by individuals who take personal advancement within the field 
seriously, but who do not conform to the biases and traditions prevailing in the field.  
The best examples of such individuals are entrepreneurial innovators who take the 
knowledge they have gained in their research and move outside the academy to 
exploit it. Thomas Alva Edison is probably the most famous example of this genre of 
intellectuals (Stokes, 1997), but similar examples bound in the IS field. Leo, the first 
information system platform (Mason, 2004), was wholly developed by such 
entrepreneurs, some of whom later on became significant IS academics. People like 
Yourdon, Jacobson, Ross, or Scheer (one of the developers of SAP and the R3 
approach) emanated from or have had close relationships with academia throughout 
their careers but did most of their intellectual work outside it.  The academic realm 
has traditionally not felt comfortable engaging in such activity, and most countries 
have legal prohibitions against universities conducting for-profit activities in overt 
competition with private firms.  An academic who wishes to run a company must 
usually leave the academy to do so.28  These individuals are driven by salience and a 
desire for strong practical results, but they do not normally care about academic 
legitimacy, and they are not happy in academia.  Nevertheless, they provide valuable 
ideas and results in the "market of ideas" with respect to salience. This also has 
happened in the IS field. 
 
The individual in Cell IV has a depersonalized view of his or her field, and is a non-
conformist with respect to established biases and traditions of the field(s).  Many 
                                                
27 This essay constitutes an example of this practice. 
28 These conditions vary from country to country. 
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scholars in unstable and emerging fields such as the IS field find themselves in this 
cell due to the nature of their intellectual mission.  The work in such fields requires 
boundary spanning in order to understand, explain, and create in ways that do not fit 
closely with well developed theoretical models within established fields in Cell I. Cell 
IV scholars must accept the fluidity and unbounded nature of inquiry at the emerging 
frontier, and often go against the established biases and traditions that reign in well 
established and confined disciplines. Academic life in Cell IV is risky, especially when 
there are no institutions to protect and legitimate the viewpoints of boundary 
spanners. Therefore, intellectuals in this cell face ridicule, criticism from arrogant 
persons, and a loss of career security. Such risks are unavoidable in unstable and 
emerging fields and have nothing to do with the lack of theoretical core, as the nature 
of the enterprise itself is about new and different contributions to the market of ideas, 
which accepts their indeterminacy.   
 
Due to its youth and the nature of its intellectual mission, the IS field has most in 
common with Cell IV.  The field arose as a rebellion against viewing the two faces of 
IS as separate social and technical systems. As a result, the IS field fought hard 
against the long-held opinion in the social sciences and management that information 
technology is only a minor and unimportant element in human enterprise and will 
continue to be so. Likewise the IS scholars have long challenged the dominant views 
among computer scientists that the engineering of IT artifacts does not need to take 
into account and understand the social and organizational issues surrounding 
computing.29  As a result, the IS field has been an academic community at the social 
margins from its start.  It does not have and, in fact, cannot afford the conditions of 
Cell I in order to prosper due to the salience and fast change in its subject grounding. 
Accordingly, Cell IV best characterizes the condition of most IS academics, 
especially those in academic programs such as management schools, surrounded by 
colleagues who believe it is their predetermined right to live in Cell I and to impose 
the expectations of Cell I on everyone else.    
 
The Cell I politics happen always within the constraints of broader societal salience 
and, therefore, nothing in Cell I is sacred or uninfluenced by changes in Cell III and 
IV. When the dot com boom hit, the salience of IT changed overnight in the social 
sciences, and the rhetoric in many of these fields changed. They became suddenly 
plastic toward IT-related issues, and many people in those fields began to claim that 
IT, or information, was now central to their endeavors. Ergo, the IS people had 
potentially little to add to the discussion as they lacked the theory.  This was 
recommended despite the fact that the history of the field witnessed a scholarly 
engagement on the topic over a 25-year period by people who had been many times 
educated as, e.g., economists or operations people! Suddenly IT was solely a 
“marketing” issue, or an “economics” issue.30  Hence, theories in Cell I can be 
expanded and re-interpreted when salience demands that one do so. Now when the 
boom has gone bust, the fickle court of elite opinion is again in some of these fields 
that there is not much in the IT realm to worry about, and the old intellectual borders, 
in fact, make more sense.   
                                                
29   This point is made elsewhere (King and Lyytinen, 2004), but bears elaboration.  It is telling 
that the National Science Foundation Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic 
Sciences funded very little research on the effects of computerization between 1970 and 
2000.  The vast majority of good social science and management research on this subject 
during that period was funded from the directorates responsible for computer science where it 
was still regarded with suspicion and at most tolerated.   
30 We are purposefully painting here a simplified account what truly happened as many 
people in economics, sociology, marketing etc. have now or even before the dot.com boom 
become our allies as new intellectual collaboration has been spawned within the IS field - an 
example of how it can work as a “market of ideas.” 
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We see that there are several ways in which the market of ideas can be strengthened 
in light of the differences and complementary assets that each cell has to offer.  The 
IS field will remain mostly in Cell IV as long as technological and social change is fast 
and the salience remains fluid. Therefore, any drastic move from this position is likely 
to be dangerous for the future of the field.31 Yet, this does not mean that the field 
cannot benefit from closer relationships and new ways of relating the work in all cells 
in “the market of ideas.” In fact, creating such connections and arenas has been and 
will continue to be a source of strength for the field. 
 
Cell I offers to IS academics an opportunity for active engagement in rigorous 
theoretical work in the field where its intellectual periphery is refined, extended, and 
tested. Many of the recent statements in the anxiety discourse are constructive 
attempts to address the tension between the praxis-oriented center and the 
intellectual periphery, and to improve these connections. The mistake in these 
attempts is that they suggest this is the sole means to keep the field viable. Though 
the field has seen several scholars move to Cell III, there is still much to regain by 
forging better alliances with the visionaries and entrepreneurs. One of the authors 
has in the past suggested building better alliances as one means to increase the 
salience of the field and its capability to respond better to the research potential 
offered by fast technological development (Lyytinen, 1999). The value of this activity 
is enormous, if it is combined within the market with the quest for sustained rigor and 
abstraction in Cell I.  
 
We feel that the field could also benefit greatly from better collaboration with Cell III 
scholars in field-specific research. Though much has been recently published on 
multiple topics dealing with the status and organizations of the discipline, there is a 
paucity of rigorous and systematic study of the evolution of the knowledge of the field 
and its legitimation mechanisms. Such studies would significantly improve 
understanding of the mechanisms that constitute the field and its future challenges 
while at the same time adding to the broader theoretical discourse around technology 
and society. The value from such inquiries is greatly improved if they increase our 
understanding of how the “market of ideas” operates and evolves.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The words of Yeats, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,” are an accurate 
description of what many in the IS field have recently observed. The goal of this 
essay is to show that this feeling is not because of what IS academics have done or 
failed to do in terms of theory; it is the nature of the work in which the field engages. 
IS academics are the falcons turning and turning in the widening gyre of the IT 
revolution.  Therefore, it is hard to get respect and resources, as so many other 
falconers are watching and using the theory weapon for disciplinary violence (King 
and Lyytinen, 2004).  This analysis shows that the tendency in the anxiety discourse 
to conflate the problems IS people face with the putative lack of academic legitimacy 
due to a weak theoretical core is both misplaced and dangerous. In its strongest 
form, the theoretical core argument draws on fallacious reasoning. In its weaker form, 
it is not grounded in careful empirical understanding of how theoretical core and 
legitimacy correlate in academic fields. The anxiety discourse is dangerous because 
it does not make the field more legitimate and at the same time makes the field move 
                                                
31 DeSanctis (2003), Galliers (2003), and Robey (2003) in their responses all suggest the 
same when they stress plasticity and action focus for the IS field. 
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away from the gyre of the IT revolution by stimulating behavior akin to that of a cargo 
cult.32  
 
In light of the evolution of multiple disciplines, and by analyzing mechanisms that 
have made them legitimate, three factors together appear to account for disciplinary 
legitimacy: 1) salience of the subjects studied,  2) the strength of results from the 
study, and 3) the plasticity of the field with respect to changing circumstances. The IS 
field already has strength in its salience and its plasticity, both of which are driven by 
the gyre of technological change.  Perhaps the real concern for the field is still a 
relative paucity of strong results.  If so, the goal of stronger results is well worth 
pursuing, and better theory is likely to contribute to this goal.  But the quest for better 
theory will contribute most only if it is understood to be one of many complements in 
the pursuit of strong results. It cannot be the sole focus, as this will place it at odds 
with salience and plasticity.  
 
The IS field will make progress on all fronts, and turn and turn in the gyre, if it comes 
to see its center as a market in the service of the “vast commerce of ideas.”  The IS 
field should also take pride in the fact that it has played an important role in making 
this vast commerce of ideas possible.  Like any other academic field, the IS field 
needs intellectual discipline. But that discipline will not be achieved by creating social 
conventions that define what is to be excluded and what is included, or establish 
rules about how members of the field must do their research. Discipline can come 
only from IS researchers themselves, interacting in the market of ideas that includes 
as part of its natural function the mechanisms for discriminating between strong and 
weak results.  If markets work well, they lower the value on anything that is not worth 
much to those doing the trading.  At the same time, markets often permit entry of 
traders with unusual wares that turn out to be of great value to everyone in the 
market, thus speeding the turn in the gyre.  The IS field should treasure those cases 
where someone of exceptional insight persuades the community to go into territory 
no one previously thought of as IS.  The center of the IS field should celebrate the 
diversity in methods and topics that join in the market, and let the market itself 
discriminate on intellectual quality—in the end this would best guarantee that the 
gyre expands as it turns.  
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